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3Executive Summary
In 2000, following a decade of turmoil in the Balkans, European leaders decided that the route
to stability in the region was through steadily closer association with the EU and the clear
prospect of membership. This policy, known as the Stabilisation and Association process,
combines the development of privileged political and economic relations with the countries in
the region, supported by substantial financial assistance programme (CARDS).
The Stabilisation and Association process is already beginning to produce the desired results
The region is becoming more stable. Its countries are engaged in ambitious political and
economic reform programmes based on EU law and practice. These achievements are set out
in detail in the attached country reports.
The Stabilisation and Association process is a long term policy. It supports sustainable
reform; but it is also designed to be, a flexible and dynamic process, evolving in line with
changes in the region, the EU and the world, and capable of coping with sudden crises. In the
coming years it will develop new ways of assisting the countries in the region in coming to
grips with continuing problems of weakness in the rule of law and democratic institutions,
corruption, the threat of resurgence of extremist nationalism, poverty and social exclusion and
in co-operating regionally.
The Stabilisation and Association process requires continued commitment on the part of both
the EU and the countries of the region to maintain a steady course towards and make the
necessary preparations for full integration of the countries of the region into the EU.
41. INTRODUCTION
The turn of the century witnessed a significant change in the EU's approach to the Western
Balkans1. EU leaders decided that a policy of emergency reconstruction, containment and
stabilisation was not, in itself, enough to bring lasting peace and stability to the Balkans: only
the real prospect of integration into European structures would achieve that . The European
Councils at Feira and Nice explicitly recognised the countries’ vocation as “potential
candidates” and spoke of “a clear prospect of accession” once the relevant conditions had
been met. The Stabilisation and Association policy has been designed to help the Balkan
countries transform that aspiration into reality, and to establish a strategic framework for their
relations with the EU .
The Stabilisation and Association process combines new contractual relationships
(Stabilisation and Association Agreements) and an assistance programme (CARDS), which
help each country to progress, at its own pace, towards the requirements of EU membership.
It is a long-term commitment to the region. It entails a formidable political effort, significant
financial resources and a major direct input of personnel and expertise.
The Stabilisation and Association Agreements are legally binding international agreements.
They draw heavily on the Europe Agreements with the candidate countries, and the
experience of the enlargement process. They are ambitious, demanding agreements, which
have at their core the basic principles which underpin membership of the Union. The SAAs
require respect for democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law; they foresee the
establishment of a free trade area with the EU: and they set out rights and obligations in areas
such as competition and state aid rules, intellectual property and establishment, which will
allow the economies of the region to begin to integrate with that of the EU.
The establishment of the Sap has coincided with - and contributed to - considerable progress
in the Balkans. Every country in the region is now a democracy . All five countries are
pushing ahead with political, economic and administrative reforms. But that progress has not
been without setbacks. The resurgence of violence in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia shows the fragility of the region, and how easily parts of it can slip back into
crisis. Critical weaknesses in the rule of law and democratic institutions, endemic corruption,
the threat of resurgence of extreme forms of nationalism, as well as poverty and social
exclusion, all pose a serious threat. These issues need to be tackled if the stabilisation process
is to become sufficiently sustainable to permit association with the EU.
The challenge for the EU is to cope with this political volatility and institutional fragility
while holding a steady course towards the strategic goal of integration of the countries of the
region into the EU. This means sticking firmly to the Stabilisation and Association process,
adjusting it as necessary to cope with changing demands and circumstances in the region.
This is an enterprise which will demand many years of political and economic investment.
This report looks in more detail at political and economic developments in the region, the
Stabilisation and Association Process, its strengths and achievements, its weaknesses and
shortfalls, the challenges still faced in the region and the way in which the EU needs to take
the process forward. This paper is accompanied by five country reports [SEC(2002)339/343]
                                                
1 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM)
5which set out the Commission’s assessment of progress, or the lack of it, in the key areas of
political and economic development and capacity to participate in the Stabilisation and
Association process. Taking due account of the specific conditions in each country, the same
criteria are applied across all of them. The Commission’s assessment is accompanied by
recommendations for action in the course of the next twelve months. This reporting exercise
will be repeated annually. It is designed to help governments, parliaments, business and
community leaders, the media, civil society and other interested parties – both in the EU and
in the region – to understand the requirement of the Stabilisation and Association process and
to help them focus political and financial resources on the key priorities.
2. THE REGION: THE COMPLEXITY OF THE JIGSAW
The break up of the former Yugoslavia, accompanied by years of war and repression, has left
behind a highly fragmented region. A surface area and population of some 25 million – about
the same as Romania – is spread across five countries in a complex ethnic jigsaw. This makes
for a region of formidable complexity. War added to enormous economic and social transition
problems in most parts of the region. All of the countries have had to start developing modern
state institutions from scratch or from a very low base. Most of the old political, economic,
and infrastructure networks collapsed. Albania, previously isolated from the rest of the world,
embarked on its transition from an even lower base.
The region is a complex political and economic mix. In the last few years, Croatia has
managed to shed its recent past relatively successfully. Others are finding it enormously
difficult to make headway against the twin obstacles of inter-ethnic obstruction and a
shattered political and economic landscape. In this environment the rot of corruption and
organised crime has set in and is seriouslyhampering efforts to establish the rule of law.
The economic picture: The economic size of the region remains small. Its total GDP is
estimated to be around €40 billion - again, similar to that of Romania. The combined GDP of
neighbouring Hungary and Slovenia - with half the population of the Western Balkans - is
nearly 70% greater. Total exports from the region in 2000 were €7.7 billion (less than three
quarters of Romania’s exports) with over half going to the EU (which also supplies over half
of the region’s imports). Trade is growing steadily if unevenly across the region but intra
regional trade remains disappointingly low, about 7% of total regional trade. Croatia, which
has less than one fifth of the region’s population, accounts for half of the region’s total
external trade. Moreover, obstacles to trade within states in the region (such as Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the FRY) are as great if not greater than those between states. Nor does their
lack of an internal market help them to pursue integration with the EU. GDP per capita also
varies considerably across the region from €1300 in Albania to €4500 in Croatia. Those
figures also disguise significant pockets of poverty and social deprivation.
All the countries of the region have made remarkable progress despite such an unpromising
background and meagre starting points. Since the upheavals in 1997, Albania has made
headway in consolidating law and order, reforming economic and social life, and opening
itself to the region and the EU- although there have been worrying indications of internal
political problems in early 2002. Bosnia and Herzegovina is beginning to deal with the
legacy of a vicious civil war. Croatia has taken decisive steps towards emulating mainstream
European democratic institutions and practice. The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia too seemed headed the same way until the major crisis of last year from which it
is now beginning to emerge. The prospect of a democratic FRY, freed from the shackles of a
despotic regime was a distant hope in 1999. With the overthrow of Milosevic and his transfer
6to face trial before the ICTY in the Hague, the country has demonstrated its determination to
make a break with its recent past and engage solidly in a process of political and socio-
economic transition.
That being said, the countries of the region still have a long road ahead before they reach EU
levels of democratic stability and socio-economic development. The task of integrating the
countries of the region into European structures remains a vast and long term undertaking.
3. THE STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS
Since its inception in May 19992 the aim of the Stabilisation and Association process has been
to equip the countries of the Western Balkans with the means, based on European practice and
standards, to maintain stable democratic institutions, to ensure the rule of law prevails and to
sustain open, prosperous economies. Underlying this is the desire to replicate the successful
transition achieved by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe before beginning
negotiations on accession to the EU. The Stabilisation and Association process is both
bilateral and regional. It creates strong links between each country and the EU. It also
strongly encourages regional co-operation between the countries themselves and with their
neighbours in the region. The EU’s own experience of the benefits of regional co-operation
lead it to believe that the Western Balkans will benefit significantly from closer co-operation.
This is an integral part of preparation for integration into European structures.
In the last two and a half years the basic building blocks of the Stabilisation and Association
Process have been put in place. These are:
Contractual Links: The preparation for and negotiation of the contractual links, the
Stabilisation and Association Agreements, between the EU and the countries of the
region is well advanced. Agreements have been signed with the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and Croatia. A negotiating mandate has been proposed for
Albania. For BiH and the FRY, the establishment of Consultative Task Forces has
proved an effective means of helping national authorities to focus on national and EU
oriented reforms and of engaging with them in a sustained way to secure
implementation of these reforms, with a view to the negotiation of a Stabilisation and
Association Agreement.
Trade Preferences: In November 2000, following an initiative by the Commission,
the EU unilaterally granted almost totally free access to its markets for goods from
the Balkans. The aim was clear: to boost the general level of imports from the
Western Balkan countries, which have so far remained very low, at less than 0,6% of
all Community imports and thereby to encourage economic growth in the region. The
trade regime serves as a catalyst to the development of a network of free-trade
agreements between the countries of the Stabilisation and Association process and
beyond. The SAAs require the countries involved to move towards full free trade
with the EU - and with each other - over a set period. The EU's decision to open its
markets has already provided a much needed stimulus to exports.
                                                
2 Conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 21 June 1999, based on the Commission Communication to the Council and the
European Parliament on the Stabilisation and Association process for countries of South-Eastern Europe [COM(99)235 of
26.5.99].
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region (over €5 billion since 1991). That assistance has changed over time as the
needs of the region evolve. A new regulation was adopted in 2000 which brings a
more strategic approach to the provision of assistance to the countries of the region.
andreinforces the objectives of the Stabilisation and Association process. As each
country moves deeper into that process, assistance will focus increasingly on support
for the reforms and institution building necessary to implement the obligations in the
Stabilisation and Association Agreements. €4.65 billion has been agreed for the
region for the 2000-2006 period.
A qualitative leap forward has been made in the programming of CARDS assistance
with the recent adoption of Country Strategies and a Regional Strategy for 2002-
2006. These programmes, designed in close consultation with the partner countries,
the Member States, relevant international organisations and other donors, focus
CARDS for the 2002-2006 period on key Stabilisation and Association priority
areas, ranging from essential reconstruction, to focused measures designed to build
each country’s institutional capacity to understand, legislate on and finally
implement core elements of the acquis and entrench the rule of law.
This improvement in programming is being matched by better implementation.
CARDS assistance is, on the whole being delivered rapidly and efficiently. The
European Agency for Reconstruction in particular has, since it establishment in
February 2000, established an impressive track record in delivering assistance
quickly and efficiently in its area of operations - initially Kosovo, but now including
Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. .
Elsewhere in the region decision-making is being devolved to Delegations on the
spot and their staffing levels are being increased in order to enhance aid delivery.
Within the international community, the EU continues to make the most substantial
contribution of human and financial resources. Assistance to the region since 1991
has been in excess of €6 billion (see annex for details).
These building blocks - the instruments of the Stabilisation and Association process
enable the EU to make a lasting contribution to institution building and sustainable
development in the region. They permit the countries of the region to draw on EU practice
and experience to decide how they should arrange their legislation and administration to
facilitate the free movement of goods, services, capital and people across their own borders,
within the region and with the EU to promote sustainable growth. The aim is to help these
countries become viable, functioning states at the same time as they align their legal and
economic systems with those of the EU. For example, each country needs to adopt an open
trade regime. This requires in turn a functioning customs system - a customs law and
adequately trained personnel to enforce the law. To be able to trade successfully within an
open EU market, the countries’ exports need to meet quality standards, certified within a
reliable standards and certification system. A system of market surveillance is needed to make
sure that the products put on the market are what they purport to be. In the banking and
financial sector, using the EU system as a model will help to guide the countries in setting up
an independent central bank with trained staff able to enforce prudential and other banking
regulations in order to facilitate the free flow of capital while ensuring that their citizens’
savings are protected.
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to bring about lasting change. The process of developing policies, adopting laws, setting up
institutions and creating functioning administrations requires a lengthy effort. It requires a
long term commitment on the part of both the countries of the region and the EU. It is not a
short term fix for crises or ad hoc events. Progress through the various stages of the process
should be determined by the pace of real change in each country. Rushing through the stages
will not prepare countries to deal with the challenges which lie ahead but successful
completion of each stage will create the groundwork for the more demanding requirements of
the next stage. The Stabilisation and Association process contributes significantly to conflict
resolution in a structural and sustainable manner, but, it cannot itself resolve crises when they
arise. The aim is to entrench a culture of the rule of law, respect for individual rights, mature
economic management in a way which makes forward momentum towards the EU
irreversible.
The Stabilisation and Association process is an accompanying policy. It does not mean that
the EU replaces or substitutes for national administrations. Rather, it supports and
accompanies the countries in the region through their transition. That is the only way to break
the dependency culture that remains a feature of parts of the Balkans landscape.
4. PROGRESS MADE AND LESSONS LEARNED
The process has acted as a catalyst for democratic change. All of the countries of the region
have embarked on strengthening democratic process and institutions, respect for the rule of
law and human rights. There are obvious weaknesses, but the commitment is there and is in
part attributable to the countries having been embraced in the Stabilisation and Association
process. The process opened the EU market to the countries of the region and has helped them
to put basic economic and commercial laws in place which should facilitate long term trade,
investment and growth. In preparing for and negotiating Stabilisation and Association
Agreements, the EU has engaged with each country to identify with each one what is needed
to develop the legislative and administrative capacity to upgrade performance towards EU
levels. It is a process which is increasingly bringing experts from the region in important
fields of policy into close contact with EU counterparts who over an extended period will
explain best EU practice and offer ideas on how to best make progress in the integration and
alignment process. In short, the Stabilisation and Association process has helped the countries
on to a track of long term political, economic and social reform. It has provided the countries
with the tools to move forward. The process is flexible and sophisticated enough to allow all
five countries to advance at a sustainable pace towards the same goal. Each country can find
its place in the process.
There are two key lessons that can be drawn from experience in implementing the
Stabilisation and Association process, namely that the process needs to be tailored to the
needs and specific conditions of the individual countries and that the proper balance
needs to be struck between stabilisation and association. With regard to the former, the
differences between the countries have become greater over time as political, constitutional
and institutional forces have propelled some to move faster than others. The speed with which
each country moves through the stages of the Stabilisation and Association process must be
judged in relation to its ability to take on the obligations of a closer association with the EU.
The process has proven itself sufficiently flexible to accommodate differing stages of
progress. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, a decision was made to
concentrate in the March 2000 EU Road Map on key prerequisites for reform. This road map
exercise was judged to be the best method to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to make the
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already enjoyed a degree of institutional and administrative maturity when it entered the
Stabilisation and Association process which enabled it to make rapid progress. The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia did not and perhaps moved too speedily through the
negotiations of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, without having the time to build
the foundations necessary for its effective implementation.
The term “Stabilisation and Association process” was carefully chosen: the distinction is a
useful one. Both elements describe what the EU is trying to achieve, and must run in parallel.
It is possible to make progress towards the formal obligations of an association while still
working on the fundamentals of stability. However, one clear lesson has been that it is
difficult to move very far along the association path unless there is a certain degree of stability
– especially respect for the rule of law and functioning political and judicial institutions.
The range of problems facing South East Europe is enormous. No matter how successful the
Stabilisation and Association process is and will continue to be, it will not transform the
region single handed. This has to be a collaborative effort – of the countries themselves and of
all the international actors in the region. One of the main achievements of the EU over the
past two years has been to get other international actors and donors to recognise and accept
the long term goal of integration into the EU, and its implementing policy, the Stabilisation
and Association process as providing the centrepiece of the international effort and the motor
of the transition process. They are increasingly gearing their efforts to complement the
process.
5. THE CONTINUED CHALLENGE
While the Stabilisation and Association Process has been successful in helping the countries
launch their wide ranging transition programmes, it has not cured the region of many of its
pressing political, economic and social problems. The region faces a number of common
challenges which require determined action on the domestic level and in the context of
regional co-operation in order to lay the foundations of modern, well governed states enjoying
good neighbourly relations. The Stabilisation and Association process cannot solve these
problems for the countries. It can however make a substantial contribution to helping the
countries help themselves. Furthermore, the Stabilisation and Association process can be
bolstered in certain areas (e.g. regional co-operation) where it has played a limited role to
date.
The main outstanding challenges are:
 The challenge of building effective, democratic states
Fragile constitutional arrangements. Contested or fragile constitutional arrangements are key
features of the political landscape in three countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FRY and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In each case this is having a significant impact on
the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association process. The EU has continued to
take a robust line on the need to respect constitutional frameworks and to discourage any
notion that it would support changes which would lead to further fragmentation in the region.
The instruments of the Stabilisation and Association process, notably CARDS, Consultative
Task Forces and Stabilisation and Association Agreements, have been used in support of this
policy. In the case of the FRY the Consultative Task Force is key to ensuring that all parts of
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the state follow a broadly compatible reform agenda towards an association with the EU. This
is designed to help bring a degree of stability to an otherwise potentially volatile situation.
Weakness in applying the rule of law. Western Balkan countries have experienced difficulty
in developing a culture where respect for the law governs all aspects of political and economic
life. The new states had to develop new institutions or adapt decrepit ones – the majority of
which are inevitably weak –- and eradicate the pervasive culture of organised crime which has
underpinned much political activity. Without an understanding at all levels of society of what
the rule of law means in everyday life, progress towards EU models and standards will stall.
Corruption is a severe problem throughout the region and a basic feature of the political
landscape. Its sheer scale and links with organised crime undermine basic public confidence
in political and constitutional order in a region where these are already fragile for other
reasons. It also deters foreign investment. Efforts are being made to address this in some
countries; but these efforts have not yet generated the momentum needed to persuade
politicians that this is a serious obstacle to moving closer to the EU.
Weakness in administrative capacity. Despite considerable variation between the countries,
administrative capacity in the region remains generally weak. In general the public
administration is neither well trained nor equipped. There is insufficient understanding of the
role of government in democratic, market economies. Lack of staff and operating budgets
mean that, even where new laws have been adopted, implementation remains very weak.
Implementing the necessary reforms, including of the civil service and of local government,
and strengthening human resources throughout the public sector are slow and difficult tasks.
But they are crucial if the countries are to develop the regulatory frameworks and structures
they need.
Questionable standards of political behaviour. The countries of the region are relatively new
democracies. Their democratic institutions are still proving themselves. This process is made
all the more difficult by a region-wide tendency to see serious confrontation, brinkmanship
and crisis as norms of political life. Pushing institutions to their constitutional limits and
beyond and failure to see the impact of such activities on the national interest are common.
The current situation in Albania exemplifies this. This behaviour is neither sustainable nor
healthy . Inevitably judgements by the EU and others on the stability of each country and its
democratic institutions will take considerable account of the way in which politics is
conducted there.
Extreme forms of nationalism. One of the more recent success stories has been the extent to
which destabilising forms of extreme nationalism have been marginalised in the current
governments of each country. The arrival of moderate governments provided the necessary
confidence to move forward the process of drawing each country closer to the EU. Over time
the attractions of extreme nationalism should diminish as its political outlook is shown to be
increasingly out of touch with the demands of modernisation and reform and integration with
the EU. However, the risk of a nationalist comeback in some countries cannot be ruled out in
forthcoming elections in the region.
Weak civil society and media. An active civil society – especially of non-government
organisations - and a genuinely independent media are crucial in making government and
civil service both transparent and accountable to the citizen. However, none of the countries
of the region can yet claim to have the level of vibrant and critical media and civil society
they need for the future. Continued improvements are needed on access to information,
legislation that facilitates NGO activities and safeguards for the free press.
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 The challenge of tackling poverty and social deprivation
The majority of macro economic indicators in the region are now moving in the right
direction. But none of the economies could be described as healthy or entirely stable. All of
them face, to differing degrees, a destabilising combination of a substantial grey economy, an
insufficiently broad tax base, a poor legal and administrative environment for foreign direct
investment, slow progress on structural reforms and privatisation, rising unemployment and in
some cases excessively high military expenditure. Poverty and social deprivation erode the
cohesiveness of the population. One of the most dispiriting problems in many parts of the
region is the brain drain of young educated people and the persistence of an educational
culture still based on inter-ethnic divisions rather than reconciliation.
 The challenge of enhancing regional co-operation
The Stabilisation and Association process has consistently underlined the importance of
regional co-operation. The heads of state/government of the five countries of the region and
of the EU agreed at the 24 November 2000 Zagreb Summit that: “Rapprochement with the
European Union will go hand in hand with this process of developing regional co-operation".
The Stabilisation and Association agreements provide the model for the extent and type of co-
operation the EU expects to be replicated between the five countries of the region.They also
require each signatory to conclude a bilateral convention on regional co-operation with other
signatories to support the creation of links between the Stabilisation and Association process
partners.
The EU is built on a foundation of regional co-operation. The experience of its founding
Member States and later adherents is that political understanding, economic and social
prosperity depend on close co-operation with neighbouring countries across the broadest
possible range of activities. The EU demonstrates how peoples can overcome hatred an
division and join together in a common cause. Integration with the EU is only possible if
future members can demonstrate that they are willing and able to interact with their
neighbours as EU Member States do. The five countries face a number of common threats
and developmental problems which they can only sensibly deal with by working together with
each other, the EU and other neighbouring countries. This requires a big effort on the part of
the countries of the region to demonstrate the maturity that would be demanded of them as
future candidate countries. The EU has no interest in reinforcing or recreating a single Balkan
space for its own sake; but rather an interest in sharing its own experience of regional co-
operation and integration between strong but mutually dependent nation states. The fears
which are sometimes expressed; for example in Croatia, that regional co-operation will hold
back its integration in Europe are groundless: co-operation with its neighbours will act as a
stimulus for further development and help the country to develop the working methods and
practices which are integral to EU membership.
The establishment of diplomatic relations and agreement on legal SFRY state succession
issues show that a degree of normalisation has been achieved in bilateral political relations.
From this good start a network of relationships based on trust and confidence should develop.
This will enable the region to reduce the risks of internal and external threats to stability and
to ensure that difficult bilateral or wider issues such as border management, energy supply
dependence, access to water resources and the sea and refugee returns are all dealt with
responsibly. A high degree of trust between the leaders of the region will be needed before the
international community can tackle an issue like the future status of Kosovo. Similarly
deepening the reconciliation between Zagreb and Belgrade is an essential element in the
stability of the region.
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Regional co-operation is essential to tackling organised crime. The web of organised crime
feeds nationalism and extremism in the countries of the region and exports its illicit products
to the EU. Two thirds of the heroin seized in the EU comes via the Balkans. With the
emergence of 5000km of new, and frequently barely managed, international borders between
the states of region, it is not a rational use of resources that each country in the region tackles
organised crime on its own. It is essential that they work together through INTERPOL and
Europol, through a functioning regional judicial network and through co-operation on asylum,
visas and readmission.
Regional co-operation is the only answer to the issue of refugees and displaced persons, over
1 million of whom remain in the region. In addition to humanitarian and social concerns for
these people, a country’s willingness to achieve genuine and sustainable reintegration of
minority returnees is an indicator of its political and democratic maturity.
Regional co-operation is a necessary accompaniment to market opening. Countries in the
region have already committed to provide market access to one another. In the Memorandum
of Understanding signed in June 2001 under the auspices of the Stability Pact, all five
countries (plus Romania and Bulgaria) agreed to sign before the end of 2002 WTO
compatible free trade agreements with each other. A number of these bilateral agreements are
already in place. Achieving this ambitious target would send a very strong signal on the
region’s determination to work together.
The countries’ strategic interest in reconnecting regional transport corridors and energy
networks between themselves and to the rest of Europe is obvious. The wider economic
development of the region and future integration with the EU and wider Trans European
Networks depends on it. It means also supporting regional programmes such as the Regional
Electricity Market (REM) for the South East of Europe or the Transport Infrastructure
Regional Study (TIRS). Together with the partner countries and with help from the
international financial institutions (notably the EIB, EBRD and World Bank), the
Commission has developed long term strategies for transport and energy in the region in
2001. These strategies have been endorsed in the framework of the Stability Pact and are
complemented by an EBRD strategy in the water sector. As the implementation of these
strategies gains pace, there will be an ever greater need for the five countries to work together
for the wider regional interest when decisions are taken on specific cross-border international
projects and networks.
Although it is not something which can be pursued at the regional level alone, similar
strategic considerations apply to telecommunications and the Information Society. Action is
needed in each country to establish the right conditions to attract private investment. Real
competition and better provision of these services in less favoured regions would be an
important motor for economic development across the whole region. The scientific and
technical co-operation between the countries of the region and the EC can also help contribute
to socio-economic development in the region.
The Stability Pact has an important role to play with the EU in helping the region take
forward these ambitions and, though its activities, in complementing and reinforcing the
Stabilisation and Association process. The work of the Pact is increasingly targeted on issues
where its networks and experience can deliver measurable results. The Commission will
contribute to the achievement of the priority objectives set out by the Special Co-ordinator at
the General Affairs Council of 11 March, where these contribute directly to the EU's strategy
under the Stablilisation and Association process.
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6. THE ROAD AHEAD
The policy of Stabilisation and Association offers an advanced and privileged relationship
with the EU, the final destination of which is clear. The process is designed to evolve and
accommodate the needs and aspirations of all five countries, including in the context of an
enlarged European Union. But to succeed in the long run, the SAP requires continued
commitment and new impetus on the part of the countries of the region and the EU.
Commitment
The countries of the region need to make long term sustained efforts and considerable
investment in order to put the fundamental parts of the EU model in place. They need
progressively to enlarge their understanding of the obligations of the process and what
implementation of the EU system really means. A particular and determined effort is called
for to entrench the rule of law as a sine qua non for stability and progress with reform. Given
the enormity of the problem of organised crime, it is essential that appropriate steps be taken
to strengthen police capacities and empower the judiciary. Work on establishing appropriate
legal bases for tackling corruption needs to be accelerated.
The EU needs to maintain its commitment to the Stabilisation and Association Process as
the only rigorous, long term and sustainable policy approach to the region. It needs to
modulate the process for each country, allowing progress at a pace commensurate with the
country’s capacity to meet obligations. The EU needs to continue the monitoring of the
process and the countries’ progress in it and will continue to do this through its Consultative
Task Forces and this annual reporting exercise.
The EU has to ensure that the financial resources the Community has available for the
implementation of the Stabilisation and Association process (€4.65 billion under CARDS) are
fully and effectively used by the end of the current financial perspective. Those resources
need to be complemented by and carefully co-ordinated with the efforts of Member States and
other international partners.
The EU needs to do more to ensure the Stabilisation and Association process is better
understood, particularly in the region, but equally in the EU and by international partners. Too
often, it is still perceived as a bureaucratic exercise, removed from the actual needs of the
people. A concerted effort still needs to be made, by the Commission, Member States and
partner governments alike, to explain the process and communicate its achievements more
effectively.
New Impetus
The SAAs formalise existing political dialogue arrangements which the EU has for each
country. But the EU needs develop further its mechanisms for enhanced political dialogue and
regional co-operation with Sap participants. The Commission therefore proposes to establish a
new political forum, - the Zagreb process - building on the success of the November 2000
Zagreb Summit, to bring together the political leaders of the region and their EU
counterparts at ministerial level on a regular basis to discuss key issues of common concern.
The aim will be to deepen their understanding of the association process and contribute to the
objective of more advanced regional co-operation, as required by the Stabilisation and
Association agreements. Such meetings would also give a clear public signal of the special
and inclusive nature of the privileged relationship between Sap participants and the EU.
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There are certain aspects of the intensive preparations common to the pre-accession process
of the candidate countries which could usefully be replicated. For example, - a particular
emphasis needs to be put on institution-building, so that countries develop policies, laws and
practices which will command the confidence of their EU counterparts. This will require
expertise from Member State administrations, as is being provided to the current candidate
countries, a requirement which will grow over time. Experience in the pre-accession context
in border control and management can also be usefully transferred to the participants in the
Stabilisation and Association process.
The EU is going through one of the most challenging periods of its development as it
prepared for the biggest enlargement in its history. It will take time to absorb new Member
States and to develop new ways of working in an enlarged Union. The Western Balkan
countries are facing an equally daunting challenge of political and economic reform,
involving extensive nation and institution building efforts. This process will also take time to
bear fruit. In meeting this challenge, and with the assistance of the EU through the
Stabilisation and Association process ,the countries of the region are gradually equipping
themselves to become credible candidates for membership. The hard work of changing the
legal and regulatory framework, developing functioning and democratically accountable
public administrations and moving towards market economies is a pre-requisite for future
membership. Just as in the current enlargement, these are the areas in which the EU will
assess the readiness of future candidates and their ability to take on the obligation of
membership. Therefore, it is the pace and extent of change inside each country which will
determine their prospects for future membership and not the date of any application for
membership.
The success of the Stabilisation and Association process as a policy will be gauged by the
extent to which the countries progressively shed their dependency on external sources of
military, administrative and financial support. The broader international community
should continually review its presence and activity in the region with a view to
disengaging in certain areas when the countries are sufficiently prepared to take on the
obligations of nationhood themselves. The engagement of the EU and the countries of the
region in the Stabilisation and Association process should facilitate this.
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ANNEX A
Summaries of individual country reports
ALBANIA
Stabilisation and Association Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 [SEC(2002) 339]
Albania started its reform seriously adrift from the level of development in Western Europe.
Early efforts to introduce democracy and build a market economy were severely undermined
by the socio-economic crisis and generalised unrest which followed the financial collapse of
1997. The lack of a democratic culture, the absence of dialogue between different political
tendencies and a limited understanding of the concept of national interest amongst political
leaders have often prevented the development and implementation of sound policies to
address the many issues that Albania faces. The tense situation in the region has also had an
adverse effect on the country’s stability. All this meant that the situation in early 1998 was
little better than that prevailing in the early years of the reform.
Since 1998 Albania’s reform efforts have been more productive : the adoption of a modern
Constitution and legislative framework, an overall improvement in macro-economic stability
and fiscal sustainability, effective implementation of the privatisation process, substantial
strengthening of the customs and tax administrations, and improvement in terms of security
and public order. Moreover, Albania has been constructive in response to the recent political
crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Presevo. All this relative progress
has brought Albania to the threshold of negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA) with the EU.
However, the starting point against which all these achievements have been measured is
extremely low and much more remains to be done to ensure further progress of Albania
within the Stabilisation and Association process (SAp). The conclusion of an SAA itself is
conditional on a sustained reform effort by Albania and on the strengthening of its
administrative capacity in order to ensure the proper implementation of such an agreement.
Albania is still beset by a confrontational political culture, where individual interests prevail
over general ones with the frequent result being political instability and poor governance.
Elections are not yet up to international standards. The judiciary remains a major problem, as
it is still ill-prepared to enforce legislation, legal reasoning is often weak and corruption is
pervasive. Overall implementation of the legal framework is poor and legal security is
insufficient to attract inward investments on a scale to contribute to sound and sustainable
economic development. Public administration is weak and still subject to political and
financial influence. In almost every area where Albania would take on obligations under a
future SAA, there is a considerable lack of implementing capacity. Despite recent economic
progress, the overall socio-economic conditions in Albania remain poor with almost one fifth
of the population living on less than 1.2 €/day. The grey economy is still too large, prevents
competition and discourages investment. The current energy crisis threatens prospects of
continued economic growth. Widespread corruption and organised crime, particularly illegal
trafficking of all types, remain very serious problems and undermine respect for the rule of
law and the foundations of the state itself.
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In order to make further progress in the Stabilisation and Association process, Albania
urgently needs to guarantee a stable political environment, with fully functioning democratic
institutions. The new Government should quickly re-focus on badly needed reforms and
accelerate their implementation.
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Stabilisation and Association Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[SEC(2002) 340]
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) faces a multiplicity of inter-related challenges. Some of the
most pressing as defined in the General Framework Agreement on Peace (GFAP - Dayton
Agreement) have been tackled with international assistance: military hostilities have stopped,
refugees have returned in significant numbers to their homes, the institutions foreseen in the
constitution have begun to function. This, however, is only a start. BiH must now look to a
future as a self-sustaining European state by prioritising a targeted programme of reform that
will enable it to take its place in the wider European order.
In terms of political reform, BiH must become a self-sustaining state based on the rule of
law. This is a pre-condition for further progress. To achieve sustainability there must be a
recognition among all sections of the BiH population that their future lies with each other and
within BiH. All sides have an interest in building a state that can manage without international
assistance and control. All BiH communities must therefore overcome the polarisation which
has often made compromise so difficult and must build constructively on the foundations laid
at Dayton. In some cases, the goal of sustainability and integration into European structures
may mean that Entity powers may have to be ceded to the State. Republika Sprska (RS) in
particular must consider that a strong state is compatible with a strong Entity, indeed that the
former is a prerequisite of the latter. National and Entity sustainability can only be built on the
basis of full BiH "ownership" of the reform process.
In terms of economic policy too sustainability is the watchword. Among the myriad
challenges, two stand out in the short to medium term. First, since the war BiH has profited
from massive, but abnormal and now declining, injections of foreign assistance. BiH must
increasingly substitute this assistance with endogenous growth. Given limited domestic
resources, it is therefore essential that BiH create the conditions to attract FDI -and this will
only be possible if there is the systemic and institutional stability and sustainability mentioned
above. A particularly important building block for economic sustainability is the development
of a functioning BiH internal market. Secondly, BiH must bring its public finances into
equilibrium. Without state resources to match state responsibilities, the sustainability of even
those reforms that have been introduced will remain in doubt.
Finally, if it is to reach its declared goal of integration into European structures BiH must
progress decisively within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) over the next
twelve months. Delays in Road Map completion reflect the complexities of BiH's internal
order, but, unfortunatelypossibly, also a willingnesswillingness by some to hide behind those
complexities. Regrettably, this has meant lost time and BiH falling behind its neighbours. The
Road Map must be completed quickly in 2002. It is important that the Road Map and the SAP
agenda are not additional requirements to political and economic reform. Rather, they identify
the most urgent priorities and give orientation and direction by putting reform and the goal of
sustainability in the context of integration into EU structures.
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Since 1995 BiH has made progress. That progress must be built on in order to achieve the
self-sustaining stability. This is essential, - for only with self-sustaining states (not Entities or
local authorities) can the EU conduct negotiations or sustain contractual bilateral relations.
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CROATIA
Stabilisation and Association Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[SEC(2002) 341]
The political environment in Croatia changed radically with the advent of the new leadership
early in 2000. The new Government has shown determination in its efforts to establish a fully
fledged democracy and to develop a culture of respect for the rule of law. This and the steps
taken so far have ended Croatia’s political and economic isolation, leading to a rapid
improvement of bilateral relations between Croatia and the European Union.
The Government now faces two main challenges: to consolidate democracy to underpin long-
term political and social stability; and to implement a comprehensive programme of structural
reforms to achieve political and economic transition. Success will require the commitment
and active participation of all parts of the public administration. Civil society, too, will need
to play a more effective role.
There has been a sea change in the approach of the current Government in the areas of
democratisation, respect for human rights including minority rights and compliance with
obligations under the Peace agreements. Considerable progress has been made. However, the
most far-reaching potential threat to the achievement of economic, political and social reform
is the continuing weaknesses of the judiciary and the resulting problems in law enforcement.
Nationalistic pressures continue to have some impact on the pace of reform. This is
particularly true for the return process, and de facto integration of the Serb minority. They
have also been a factor in the handling of co-operation with ICTY. In addition, nationalistic
pressures affect the attitude of the Government to increased regional co-operation. While at
the bilateral, practical, level there have been important steps forward there is a persistent
tendency to over-politicise and over-estimate the impact of and intentions behind regional
initiatives. Croatia needs finally to overcome regional and historical frictions and take a more
open approach to addressing outstanding political questions with its neighbours.
Macroeconomic indicators show that the state of the economy is improving. The Government
has begun the process of economic and structural reform. This is proceeding at a slower pace
than expected, but tangible results are expected within the medium-term and already in the
course of 2002. High unemployment remains a main concern.
The signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) was an indicator of the
steadily improving relationship between Croatia and the European Union. The credibility of
Croatia’s aspirations to become a candidate for EU membership depends in the first instance
on how successfully it implements the SAA, which offers a clear route to bringing the country
closer to European standards. The Agreement has had an immediate and concrete impact on
the domestic reform programme. For instance, the Government is making serious efforts to
establish the necessary legislative framework. However, the implementation of adopted
legislation remains a major challenge and the administration needs to look at its own capacity
to implement the reforms and address the deficits it finds. Although the Government appears
to appreciate this, it continues to focus too much on the headline political objectives of
Croatia’s European policy rather than on the enormous effort that moving closer to European
standards requires.
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Stabilisation and Association Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[SEC(2002) 343]
During 2001, a full-fledged strong commitment to reform, and some real progress, has been
evident in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Republic of Serbia, Kosovo and the Republic
of Montenegro). The "classical" problems of a country in transition are of course compounded
by unsolved issues of constitutional status, and, until recently, the less cooperative attitude
shown by one constituent Republic, which undermines the functioning of the state. It is vital
that these do not interfere with reform efforts - reforms which are in any event required
throughout the country - and is not permitted to cause instability beyond the borders of the
FRY.
In terms of political reform, the overall impression is positive. In the relatively short period
since the new Governments took office, Belgrade has shown clear political determination to
undertake the necessary reforms. Respect for fundamental principles has improved, though
better coordination and implementation is required. FRY has continued its efforts to build
bilateral and multilateral relationships throughout the region and beyond. FRY respect for
international obligations (ICTY) requires urgent improvement if it is not to become an
obstacle to integration into European structures. There has been progress too in Kosovo, with
continuing international efforts to build democracy and the rule of law, and political change in
the form of the development of a Constitutional Framework and the successful elections to the
new provisional institutions of self-government. The transfer of competencies to the elected
representatives would have been possible more quickly had they shown more leadership.
More progress might have been expected in Montenegro, after three years of democratic
government. It is important, throughout the FRY, that momentum for difficult political
reforms does not falter in the face of the challenges ahead, and that potential brakes on
progress - such as corruption - are tackled urgently.
Substantial progress has been made on the economic front, with the ending of the isolation of
the FRY, the holding of a successful Donors' Conference and the delivery of substantial
quantities of assistance, the resolution of most of the country's external debts and the rapid
move from post-conflict reconstruction to transition. There is clear international consensus
that Belgrade has already laid the correct bases of economic reform and development in the
first year of transition. At macro-economic level, the correct financial and fiscal steps have
been taken. The economic development of Kosovo, though from a low base, continues with
donor support and guidance. More progress in implementation of economic reforms should
have been evident in Montenegro, in its third year of transition. The implementation of
economic reforms slowed down in the beginning of 2001, but after the April elections further
progress was made in some sectors although budget financing remains difficult.
As the pace of transition picks up in 2002, there should be deepening structural reforms
throughout the FRY - moving from the adoption to the implementation stage of reforms,
bringing all parts of the FRY to the same level so as to permit the state to move forward. The
authorities will also face the challenge of maintaining public support for the difficult and
necessary reforms ahead. For the mutual benefit of all parts of the FRY, and with a view to
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FRY drawing closer to the EU, priority must also be given - particularly but not only in the
economic field - to the recreation and efficient functioning of the single economic space
within the state and the implementation of EU-compatible reforms throughout the state.
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Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Stabilisation and Association Report
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[SEC(2002) 342]
In 2001 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia faced the most serious political and
security crisis in its history. This has had a major impact on the economy, democratic
institutions and the administration’s ability to take forward the process of reform. With a
significant political and economic investment by the EU and the rest of the International
Community, the country has shown determination in overcoming the crisis but needs to
maintain its efforts to ensure stability. The crisis revealed severe weaknesses in the country’s
democratic institutions and underlined the need for a major effort to underpin the stability of
its institutions, thus guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for
and protection of minorities. The changes to the Constitution in November 2001 and the
adoption of the Law on Local Self-Government in January 2002 were a very positive step in
this direction. The full implementation of the Framework Agreement of August 2001 is
essential to build the necessary country-wide political consensus and stability needed for the
reform effort ahead.
The economic situation deteriorated during 2001, largely as a result of the security crisis.
Macro-economic stability was not maintained and most indicators moved in the wrong
direction. Implementation of its structural reform programme is a top priority and will require
a significant political and administrative effort. Privatisation of the state-owned enterprises
and sale or liquidation of large loss making enterprises wereunfortunately delayed.
Transparency of the privatisation process has not been ensured. Despite improvements in the
regulatory framework of the bank supervision, the health of banking system remains fragile.
The reforms are urgently needed if the country is to be able to cope with the competitive
pressures and market forces which will flow from the full implementation of the Interim
Agreement.
With regard to the structure and functioning of the administration the adoption of the legal
framework for the decentralisation of public administration was an important step forward
which should also contribute to the wider stability of the country. In general, however, the
public administration has some way to go before it can adequately fulfil all the tasks required
of it in a functioning democracy based on the rule of law. The weakness of the judiciary and
the consequent difficulties for law enforcement remain. Corruption is a serious cause for
concern and it is crucial that the government tackles this energetically through an action plan
of specific measures.
The signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in April 2001 and the
coming into force on 1 June 2001 of the Interim Agreement was an important step in the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s efforts to move closer to the EU. But careful,
thorough implementation of these obligations will be the only real indicator of progress.
However, the political crisis has slowed down the process of institutional and legislative
change which is necessary if the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is to come close to
European structures. It is important that every effort is made in 2002 to refocus attention on
the implementation of the Interim Agreement.
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ANNEX B
1991-2001 EC assistance to the Western Balkans
Commitments in millions of euro
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 TOTAL
ALBANIA
Phare/Cards 10,00 75,00 40,00 49,00 53,00 53,00 70,40 42,50 99,90 35,45 37,50 565,75
Democracy & Human
Rights
1,00 0,60 0,40 0,80 0,17 0,52 0,40 3,89
Specific actions 2,60 1,92 4,52
Humanitarian aid 4,13 1,15 1,65 16,30 11,00 97,07 3,40 6,60 141,30
FEOGA 120,00 120,00
Food security 10,80 5,50 16,30
Macroec. assistance [1] 70,00 15,00 20,00 105,00
Total = 368,13 70,15 75,25 97,90 54,30 205,24 41,29 44,50 956,76
BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
Phare/Obnova/Cards 0,21 0,65 229,77 211,16 190,50 118,36 100,85 105,23 956,73
Democracy & Human
Rights
0,70 4,80 4,80 1,80 0,79 0,62 0,80 14,31
Specific actions 70,00 65,40 39,90 15,00 30,90 3,96 225,16
Humanitarian aid 495,26 145,03 142,45 105,00 87,95 58,90 0,40 0,75 1.035,74
Macroec. assistance [1] 25,00 10,00 25,00 60,00
Total = 495,47 216,38 442,42 360,86 295,25 233,95 115,83 131,78 2.291,93
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CROATIA
Obnova/Cards 0,09 0,31 11,71 10,26 15,59 11,50 18,34 60,00 127,80
Democracy & Human
Rights
0,70 2,20 0,60 0,21 0,97 0,50 5,18
Specific actions 1,00 0,42 0,31 0,98 2,71
Humanitarian aid 204,77 38,43 21,15 14,50 6,95 6,50 292,30
Total = 204,86 38,74 33,56 26,96 24,14 18,63 19,62 61,48 427,99
FRY - Serbia / Montenegro
Obnova/Cards 0,37 1,18 0 4 10,38 26,90 208,95 230,00 481,97
Democracy & Human
Rights [2]
1,90 0,70 0,80 2,50 2,05 4,95 12,90
Specific actions 1,76 1,76
Humanitarian aid 170,25 36,87 23,40 13,50 11,20 93,70 59,64 55,40 463,96
Macroec. assistance [1] 20,00 260,00 280,00
Total = 170,62 39,95 24,47 18,13 24,08 124,41 288,59 550,35 1.240,59
FRY – Kosovo
Obnova/Cards 13,16 127,00 439,90 320,00 900,06
Democracy & Human
Rights
0,38 0,38
Specific actions 6,00 6,00
Humanitarian aid 111,70 28,84 13,92 154,46
Food security 20,90 20,90
Macroec. assistance [1] 35,00 15,00 50,00
Total = 13,16 259,60 510,12 348,92 1.131,8
0
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FYROM
Phare/Obnova/Cards [3] 65,00 25,28 25,00 33,21 25,28 68,70 21,20 56,20 319,87
Democracy & Human
Rights
0,50 0,20 0,10 0,52 1,35 2,67
Humanitarian aid 36,52 9,15 39,81 5,35 5,40 96,23
Rapid Reaction Mechanism 12,80 12,80
Macroec. assistance [1] 25,00 15 20,00 10,00 70,00
Total = 101,52 34,43 25,00 58,71 40,48 108,61 47,07 85,75 501,57
Regional
Phare/Obnova/Cards 81,44 0,61 0,15 1,45 8,40 2,20 18,75 20,00 133,00
Democracy & Human
Rights
5,30 0,90 6,40 7,36 3,68 23,64
Specific actions 2,71 2,71
Humanitarian aid 17,10 20,00 17,00 39,32 1,08 1,00 95,50
Total = 98,54 20,61 0,15 6,75 26,30 47,91 29,90 24,68 254,84
GRAND TOTAL = 1.439,15 420,26 600,85 569,30 477,70 998,35 1.052,41 1.247,46 6.805,48
[1] Macroeconomic assistance refers to disbursement and includes grants and loans.
[2] The figure in 2001 refers to the FRY as a whole.
[3] Including Cards Emergency Package of €13.7 million) in 2001.
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ANNEX C
Human Rights Conventions ratified by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, FRY and fYROM
31 January 2002
Albania Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Croatia FRY FYROM
Adherence to the following
conventions and protocols
ECHR (European
Convention
on Human Rights)
R: 20.10.96 O R: 5.11.97 O S: 9.11.95
R: 10.4.97
Protocol 1 (right of property) O O R: 5.11.97 O S: 14.6.96
R: 10.4.97
Protocol 4 (freedom movement
et al.)
R: 02.10.96 O R: 5.11.97 O S: 14.6.96
R: 10.4.97
Protocol 6 (death penalty) R: 21.09.00 O R: 5.11.97 O S: 14.6.96
R: 10.4.97
Protocol 7 (ne bis in idem) R: 01.01.97 O R: 5.11.97 O S: 14.6.96
R: 10.4.97
European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture
R: 02.10.96 O R: 11.10.97 O S: 14.6.96
R: 6.6.97
European Social Charter R: 12.01.96 O S: 8.3.99 O S: 5.5.98
R: —
Revised European Social
Charter
R: 21.09.98 O O O O
Framework Convention for
National Minorities
R: 28.09.99 R (BiH non
member of CoE)
R: 11.10.97 R S: 25.7.96
R: 10.4.97
ICCPR (International
Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights)
O R (succession) R: 8.10.91 R Succession:
18.1.94
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
(right of individual
communication)
O R R: 12.1.96 R Accession:
12.12.94
Second Optional Protocol to
ICCPR (death penalty)
R: 21.09.00 R R: 12.1.96 R Succession:
26.1.95
ICESCR (International
Covenant
on Economic, Social and
Cultural
rights)
O R (succession) R: 8.10.91 R Succession:
18.1.94
CAT (Convention against
Torture)
R: 02.10.96 R (succession) R: 8.10.91 R Succession:
12.12.94
CERD (Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination)
O R (succession) R: 8.10.91 R Succession:
18.1.94
CEDAW (Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against
Women)
O R (succession) R: 8.10.91 R Succession:
18.1.94
Optional Protocol to the
CEDAW
O S R: 8.10.91 O S: 3.4.00
CRC (Convention on the
Rights
of the Child)
O R (succession) R: 8.10.91 R Succession:
2.12.93
R = ratified
S = Signed
O = neither ratified or signed
